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1. Introduction 
Engineers dealing with different scaled and interconnected engineering systems such as 
tactical wireless RF communication systems have growing needs for analyzing complex 
adaptive systems. We propose a systemic engineering methodology based on systematic 
resolution of complex issues in engineering design. Issues arise which affect the success of 
each process. There are a number of potential solutions for these issues, which are subject to 
discussion based on the result assembled from a variety of sources with a range of measures. 
There are needs to assemble and balance the results in a success measure showing how well 
each solution meets the system’s objectives. The uncertain arguments used by the participants 
and other test results are combined using a set of mathematical theory for analysis. This 
process-based construction helps not only in capturing the way of thinking behind design 
decisions, but also enables the decision-makers to assess the support for each solution. The 
complexity in this situation arises from the many interacting and conflicting requirements of 
an increasing range of possible parameters. There may not be a single ‘right’ solution, only a 
satisfactory set of resolution, which this system helps to facilitate. Applying systems 
engineering approaches will definitely help in measuring and analyzing tactical RF wireless 
networks, smart and innovative performance matrixes through tactical modeling and 
simulation scenarios may also be developed and enhanced. Systematic utilize of systems 
engineering approaches with RF electronic warfare modeling and simulation scenarios can 
support future research in vulnerability analysis of RF communication networks. RF electronic 
tactical models are used to provide a practical yet simple process for assessing and investigate 
the vulnerability of RF systems. The focus is also on tactical wireless network within a system 
of systems (SoS) context research area and to provide a comprehensive network assessment 
methodology. Researchers have proposed a variety of methods to build network trees with 
chains of exploits, and then perform normal post-graph vulnerability analysis. This chapter 
presents an approach to use mathematical Bayesian network to model, calculate and analyze 
all potential vulnerability paths in wireless RF networks.  
2. Main methodology 
Tactical wireless network vulnerabilities continually being reported and critically studied 
with many U.S. government organizations. The need for a comprehensive framework of 
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network vulnerability assessment using systems engineering approach [24] [26] [27] [28] has 
been an increasing challenge to many research analysts. Researchers have proposed a more 
systematic way to manage wireless network nodes and trees with possible chains of events, 
and then perform normal post-graph vulnerability assessments with system of systems 
methodology. The most recent system engineering approaches are building attack trees by 
trying to number all potential attack paths with vulnerabilities identification, node 
probabilities calculations, inference analysis, and weights assignments by system experts. 
These are expert driven vulnerabilities analysis. Assessment and identification are one of the 
main key issues in making sure the property security of a given deployed tactical RF 
communication network. The vulnerability assessment process involves many uncertain 
factors reside within both the networks and the network nodes. Threat assessment or 
injecting threats is one of the major factors of evaluating a situation for its suitability to 
support decision-making and the indication of the security of a given tactical RF 
communication network system. One approach is using experienced decision makers 
database. This type of expert driven database recorded most of their decisions on 
vulnerability identification. The decision-makers use past experience for their decisions. The 
decision will be based upon previously good solutions that have worked in similar real life 
scenarios. The approach is to extract the most significant characteristics from the lay-down 
situation. Any similar situations and actions that have worked well in past cases will be 
considered in the assessment due to the present or the lack of certain essential 
characteristics. The assessment and identification is to create relevant relations between 
objects in the tactical RF network environment. Tactical communication RF wireless 
networks are best illustrated by Mr. David L. Adamy [11] in his book. Bayesian network 
(BN) and the related methods [17] is an effective tool for modeling uncertainty situation and 
knowledge. This paper discusses Bayesian’s Theory [17], Bayesian networks and their ability 
to function in a given tactical RF communication network [11] for vulnerabilities analysis 
and identification. This short chapter presents an approach to use Bayesian network to 
model all potential vulnerabilities or attack paths in tactical RF wireless network. We will 
call such graph as “Bayesian network vulnerabilities graph” for a given tactical RF wireless 
network. It provides a more compact representation of attack paths than conventional 
methods. Bayesian inference methods can be used for probabilistic analysis. It is necessary 
to use algorithms for updating and computing optimal subsets of attack paths relative to 
current knowledge about attackers. Tactical RF wireless models were tested on a small 
example JCSS [12] network. Simulated test results demonstrate the effectiveness of 
approach. 
2.1 Why systems engineering is used here 
Systems engineering [7] [8] [27] [28] is applied here to assist the rapid design and 
development of complex systems such as tactical wireless communication systems. Systems 
engineering [29] uses engineering sciences techniques with operations research. Operations 
research also tackles with designing complex systems. Our goal is to utilize concurrent 
engineering principles in systems engineering analysis that covers our design goals and 
testing requirements in developing the RF communication system. The systems approach to 
solving complex problems are critical since integrating complex analysis and building of RF 
communication models requires synthesis of different methods. Systems approach is widely 
used and successful in fields of engineering, for example systems engineering. It is most 
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effective in treating complex phenomena in tactical wireless RF communication networks. 
All this requires the use of modular views that clearly illustrate the component features of 
the whole system. The views may be put into different parts with proper interfaces. 
Extended knowledge may be gained about the parts in order to further understand the 
whole nature of a given tactical RF communication system. The system and its details in 
many levels may then be decomposed into several subsystems and into sub-subsystems, 
and so on, to the last details. In the same time, we can change focus to view different levels 
so that users are not overwhelmed by complexity. From time to time abstracts level 
information may be hided to gain focus on a certain task for detailed analysis. We may just 
simplify the system by treating some of its parts as black boxes except their interfaces. 
Hiding information for certain RF tactical analysis is not discarding it. The same black box 
can be opened at later time for other uses. Systems engineering can make a complex system 
more tractable and some of the parts can be studied or designed with minimal interference 
from other parts. All these protective measures can control defective designs and improves 
system level performance. The systems approach is effective not only for understanding or 
designing tactical RF wireless communication systems but also for abstract construction in 
mathematics and theories. Instead of an actual RF communication physical module, a RF 
wireless network “subsystem” can be a concept within a conceptual scheme and its 
“interfaces” can be relations to other in the scheme. Analyses and concepts are sometimes 
needed to approximate in the beginning. We can then refine approximations step by step 
towards a better answer with our method of analysis. Systems approach is not merely 
system-level approach but rather delving into lower-level subsystems. The system-level is 
powerful and appropriate in some cases, but it also misses out on most structures plus 
dynamics of the system and it is not employed in our systems approach, modularity study 
here. Systems approach is an integral part of systems engineering. Our analysis here may 
also call reduction, and "lessening" to yet finer information that also mean the importance of 
detailed analysis. 
3. System of systems in tactical wireless network  
In general, system of systems [9] [10] is a compilation of task-oriented or dedicated systems 
that bundle their resources and capabilities together to obtain a newer, more complex 
system that offers more functionality and performance than simply the summation of basic 
systems. Currently, system of systems is a critical research discipline that supplements 
engineering processes, quantitative analysis, tools, and design methods. The methodology 
to define, abstract, model, and analyze system of systems problems is typically referred to as 
system of systems engineering. We are going to define features for a system of systems that 
are unique for our study of tactical wireless communication system. The goal will be linking 
systems into joint system of systems allows for the interoperability and integration of 
Command, Control, Computers, Communications, and Information (C4I) and Intelligence, 
Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) Systems as description in the field of information 
management control in modern armed forces. The system of systems integration is a method 
to pursue better development, integration, interoperability, and optimization of systems to 
enhance performance in future combat zone scenarios that related to area of information 
intensive integration. As one can predict that modern systems that comprise system of 
systems problems are not merely massive, rather they have some common characteristics: 
operational independence of the individual systems and managerial independence of the 
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systems. System of systems problems are a collection of multiple domain networks of 
heterogeneous systems that are likely to exhibit operational and managerial independence, 
geographical distribution, and emergent and evolutionary behaviors that would not be 
apparent if the systems and their interactions are modeled separately. Taken together, all 
these background requirements suggest that a complete system of systems engineering 
framework is considered necessary to improve decision support for system of systems 
problems. In our case, an effective system of systems engineering framework for tactical RF 
communication network models are desired to help decision makers to determine whether 
related infrastructure, policy, and/or technology considerations are good, efficient, or 
deficient over time. The urgent need to solve system of systems problems is critical not only 
because of the growing complexity of today’s technology challenges, but also because such 
problems require large resource commitments and investments with multi-years cost. The 
bird-eyes view using system-of-systems approach will allow the individual system 
constituting a system of systems that can be different and operate independently. The 
interactions expose certain important emergent properties. These emergent patterns have an 
evolving nature that the RF communication system stakeholders must recognize, analyze, 
and understand. The system of systems way of thinking promotes a new way of approach 
for solving grand challenges where the interactions of current technology, organization 
policy, and resources are the primary drivers. System of systems study is also integrated the 
study of designing, complexity and systems engineering with additional challenge of 
design. Systems of systems typically exhibit the behaviors of complex systems. However, 
not all complex problems fall into the area of systems of systems. System of systems by 
nature, are several combinations of qualities, not all of which are exhibited in the operation 
of heterogeneity networks of systems. Current research into effective approaches to system 
of systems problems includes: proper frame of reference, design architecture. Our study of 
RF communication network modeling, simulation, and analysis techniques will include 
network theory, agent-based modeling, probabilistic (Bayesian) robust design (including 
uncertainty modeling/management), software simulation and programming with multi-
objective optimization. We have also studied and developed various numerical and visual 
tools for capturing the interaction of RF communication system requirements, concepts, and 
technologies. Systems of systems are still being employed predominantly in the defense 
sector and space exploration. System of Systems engineering methodology is heavily used in 
U.S. Department of Defense applications, but is increasingly being applied to many non-
defense related problems such as commercial PDA data networks, global communication 
networks, space exploration and many other System of Systems application domains. 
System-of-Systems engineering and systems engineering are related but with slightly 
different fields of study. Systems engineering addresses the development and operations of 
one particular product like the RF communication networks. System-of-Systems engineering 
addresses the development and operations of evolving programs. Traditional systems 
engineering seeks to optimize an individual system (i.e., the target product), while System-
of-Systems engineering seeks to optimize network of various interacting legacy and new 
systems brought together to satisfy multiple objectives of the program. It enables the 
decision-makers to understand the implications of various choices on technical performance, 
costs, extensibility and flexibility over time and the effective of methodology. It may prepare 
decision-makers to design informed architectural solutions for System-of-Systems context 
type problems. The objective in our research is to focus on tactical wireless network within a 
system of systems (SoS) context research area. The ultimate goal is to provide a 
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comprehensive network assessment methodology and possible framework with systems 
engineering approach. 
4. Approach with system engineering  
Systems engineering [7] [8] [9] is employed here to look into wireless network 
vulnerabilities with simulation and modeling work-processes. Sets of useful tools are 
developed to handle the vulnerability analysis part of the RF wireless network. In the 
research, we have summarized a variety of methods to build network trees with chains of 
possible exploits, and then perform normal post-graph vulnerability assessment and 
analysis. Recent approaches suggest building more advanced attack trees by trying to 
number all potential attack paths with vulnerabilities identification, node probabilities 
calculations, inference analysis, weights assignments by system experts. Vulnerabilities 
analysis, assessment and identification are one of the key issues in making sure the security 
of a given tactical RF communication network. The vulnerability assessment process 
involves many uncertain factors. Threat assessment is one of the major factors of evaluating 
a situation for its suitability to support decision-making and the indication of the security of 
a given tactical RF communication network system. Systems engineering methodology in 
the research plays a critical role to help develop a distinctive set of concept and 
methodology for the vulnerability assessment of tactical RF communication networks. 
Systems engineering approaches have been developed to meet the challenges of engineering 
functional physical systems of tactical RF communication networks with complexity. The 
system engineering process employs here is a brand of holistic concept of system 
engineering processes. With this holistic view in mind, the systems engineering focuses are 
on analyzing and understanding the potential U.S. government customer needs. Re-useable 
RF connectivity models with requirements and functionality are implemented early in the 
development cycle of these RF communication network models. We then proceed with 
design synthesis and system validation while considering the complete problem, the system 
lifecycle. Based upon the concept by Oliver et al. [23], systems engineering technical process 
are adopted during the course of the research. Within Oliver's model [23], the technical 
process includes assessing available information, defining effectiveness measures, to create a 
behavior Bayesian vulnerabilities model, create a structure model, perform trade-off 
analysis, and create sequential build & test plan. At the same time, a RF communication 
system can become more complex due to an increase in network size as well as with an 
increase in the amount of vulnerabilities data, engineering variables, or the number of fields 
that are involved in the analysis. The developments of smarter matrices with better 
algorithms are the primary goals of the research. With disciplined systems engineering, it 
enables the use of tools and methods to better comprehend and manage complexity in 
wireless RF network systems for in-depth analysis. These tools are developed using 
modeling and simulation methodologies, optimization calculations and vulnerabilities 
analysis. Taking an interdisciplinary engineering systems approach to perform 
vulnerabilities analysis using Bayesian graph with weights calculation is inherently 
complex. The behavior of and interaction among RF wireless network system components 
can be well defined in some cases. Defining and characterizing such RF communication 
systems and subsystems and the interactions among them that supports vulnerabilities 
analysis is one of the goals of the research. 
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5. Insights behind research  
Decision matrix is used for vulnerabilities analysis in the research. Decision matrix is an 
arrangement of related qualitative or quantitative values in terms of rows and columns. It 
allows our research to graphically identify, analyze, and rate the strength of relationships 
between sets of information in vulnerabilities. Elements of a decision matrix represent 
decisions based upon calculations and Bayesian network (BN) on certain vulnerabilities 
decision criteria. The matrix development is especially useful and critical for looking at large 
sample numbers of decision factors and assessing each factor’s relative importance. Decision 
matrix employs in the research is used to describe a multi-criteria decision analysis (MCDA) 
for the tactical RF wireless network. When given a MCDA problem, where there are M 
alternative options and each need to be assessed on N criteria, can be described by the 
decision matrix which has M rows and N columns, or M × N elements. Each element, such 
as Xij, is either a single numerical value or a single grade, representing the performance of 
alternative i on criterion j. For example, if alternative i is "Wireless Node i", criterion j is 
"Background Noise" assessed by five grades {Excellent, Good, Average, Below Average, 
Poor}, and " Wireless Node i" is assessed to be "Good" on "Background Noise", then Xij = 
"Good". The matrix table 1 is shown below: 
 
Table 1.  
5.1 Multiple criteria decision 
Using a modified belief decision matrix, the research is now more refined and the matrix can 
describe a multiple criteria decision analysis (MCDA) problem in the Evidential Reasoning 
Approach. In decision theory, the evidential reasoning approach is a generic evidence-based 
multi-criteria decision analysis (MCDA) approach for dealing with problems having both 
quantitative and qualitative criteria under various uncertainties. This matrix may be used to 
support various decision analysis, assessment and evaluation activities such as wireless RF 
networks environmental impact assessment and wireless RF networks internal nodes 
(transceiver) assessment based on a range of quality models that are developed. For a given 
MCDA, there are M alternative options and each need to be assessed on N criteria, then the 
belief decision matrix for the problem has M rows and N columns or M X N elements. 
Instead of being a single numerical value or a single grade as in a decision matrix, each 
element in a belief decision matrix is a belief structure. For example, suppose Alternative i is 
"Wireless Node i", Criterion j is "Background Noise" assessed by five grades {Excellent, 
Good, Average, Below Average, Poor}, and "Wireless Node i" is assessed to be “Excellent” 
on "Message Completion Rate" with a high degree of belief (i.g. 0.6) due to its low 
Transmission Delay, low Propagation Delay, good Signal-to-Noise Ratio and low Bit Error 
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Rate. At the same time, the quality is also assessed to be only “Good” with a lower degree of 
confidence (i.g. 0.4 or less) because its fidelity and "Message Completion Rate (MCR) can 
still be improved. If this is the case, then we have Xij={ (Excellent, 0.6), (Good, 0.4)}, or Xij={ 
(Excellent, 0.6), (Good, 0.4), (Average, 0), (Below Average, 0), (Poor, 0)}. A conventional 
decision matrix is a special case of belief decision matrix when only one belief degree in a 
belief structure is 1 and the others are 0. The modified matrix table 2 is shown below: 
 
Table 2.  
5.2 Probability distributions  
The research may help to develop a more systematic and automated approach for building 
“Bayesian network vulnerabilities graph” with weights assignment for vulnerability study 
in tactical wireless RF networks [11]. Bayesian network [17] is designed in vulnerabilities 
graph and models all potential attack steps in a given network. As describe by T. Leonard 
and J. Hsu [17], using Bayesian’s rule as a special case involving continuous prior and 
posterior probability distributions and discrete probability distributions of data, but in its 
simplest setting involving only discrete distributions, the theorem relates the conditional 
and marginal probabilities of events A and B, where B has a certain (non-zero) probability as 
in (1): 
  P(A|B) = (P(B|A)P(A))/P(B) (1) 
Each term in the theorem has a conventional name: P(A) is the prior probability or marginal 
probability of A. It is "prior" in the sense that it does not take into account any information 
about B. P(A|B) is the conditional probability of A, given B. It is also called the posterior 
probability because it is derived from or depends upon the specified value of B. P(B|A) is 
the conditional probability of B given A. P(B) is the prior or marginal probability of B, and 
acts as a normalizing constant. The theorem in this form gives a mathematical 
representation of how the conditional probability of even A given even B is related to the 
converse conditional probability of even B when given even A. In our research, each 
wireless network node represents a single security and vulnerability point and contains 
property violation mode; each link edge corresponds to an exploitation of one or more 
possible vulnerabilities and each network path represents a series of exploits that can signify 
a potential vulnerability for attack within the RF wireless network. The communication 
model takes on characteristics of a tactical wireless RF network, and we consider an 
integrated posterior probability of Bayesian networks (BN) [17] with well-defined security 
metric represents a more comprehensive quantitative vulnerability assessment of a given 
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tactical RF networks which contain different communication stages. Posterior probability is 
a revised probability that takes into account new available information. For example, let 
there be two stages within a given wireless transceiver. Wireless stage A having 
vulnerability or 0.35 accuracy due to noise factor and 0.85 accuracy due to jamming factor 
and wireless stage B having vulnerability or 0.75 accuracy due to noise factor and 0.45 
accuracy due to jamming. Now if wireless stage is selected at random, the probability that 
wireless stage A is chosen is 0.5 (50% chance, one out of two stage). This is the a priori 
probability for the vulnerability of wireless communication stage. If we are given an 
additional piece of information that a wireless stage was chosen at random from the 
wireless network, and that the factor is noise, what is the probability that the chosen 
wireless stage is A? Posterior probability takes into account this additional information and 
revises the probability downward from 0.5 to 0.35 according to Bayesian’s theorem. Also, 
the noise factor effect is more probable from stage B (0.75) than stage A (0.35). When the 
factor is jamming instead, the probability that the chosen wireless stage is A will be revised 
upward from 0.5 to 0.85 instead. Then, the vulnerability related jamming factor now is 
definitely less probable from stage B (0.45) than stage A (0.85). With conditional 
independence relationship encoded in a Bayesian network (BN) can be stated as follows: a 
wireless node is independent of its ancestors given its parents, where the ancestor/parent 
relationship is with respect to some fixed topological ordering of the wireless nodes. Using 
figure 1 below to demonstrate the outcomes, by the chain rule of probability with stages C, 
S, R & W, the joint probability of all the nodes in the vulnerabilities graph is now become: 
P(C, S, R, W) = P(C) * P(S|C) * P(R|C,S) * P(W|C,S,R). By using conditional independence 
relationships, we can rewrite this as: P(C, S, R, W) = P(C) * P(S|C) * P(R|C) * P(W|S,R) 
where we are allowed to simplify the third term because R is independent of S given its 
parent C, and the last term because W is independent of C given its parents S and R. We can 
see that the conditional independence relationships allow us to represent the joint more 
compactly. Here the savings are minimal, but in general, if we had n binary nodes, the full 
joint would require O( 2 n N ) space to represent, but the factored form would require  
O(n 2 k ) space to represent, where k is the maximum fan-in of a node with fewer overall 
parameters. 
5.3 Wireless communication models 
In the model, we concern about the vulnerability of the wireless network caused by the 
failure of various communication stages in the wireless RF communication network. Figure 
2 clearly presents the logical communication block diagram of our RF model. Each stage in a 
RF network is profiled with network and system configurations with exhibited 
vulnerabilities. They are identified through the breaking down of a given transceiver into 
transmitter and receiver with different stages. The purpose of our modeling and simulation 
goals is to make use the DISA JCSS Transceiver Pipeline stages [12]. All vulnerabilities data 
may be collected and the following information may be collected at run-time: (1) Effect of 
the transmission on nodes in the vicinity. (2) Set of nodes will attempt to receive the packet. 
(3) Determine a node attempting to receive a packet successfully. (4) Time it take for a 
packet to be transferred to the receiver. To start with the transmitter, we break down the 
transceiver into different radio pipeline stages. On the transmitter side, the transmitter has a  
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Fig. 1. Vulnerabilities graph (simple stage within a wireless node) 
   
Fig. 2. JCCS pipeline stages are defined for a wireless communication model 
“Group Receiver” start with the index “Group 0”. The transmitter executed once at the start of 
simulation for each pair of transmitter and receiver channels or dynamically by OPNET JCSS’s 
[12] Kernel Procedure (KP) calls. Inside the radio pipeline stages of the receiver side, for every 
receiver channel which “passed” the transmission checks, the simulated RF packet will "flow" 
through the pipe. Using JCSS [12] and OPNET Modeler, it is very critical to make sure the JCSS 
Radio Pipeline Model [12] attributes are being configured correctly. This is particular 
important for military RF radios like EPLRS [12] during a lay-down of network nodes in 
different scenarios. In all cases, configuration should be retained and saved in the node model. 
In summary, for Radio Transmitter, there are six (6) different stages (stage 0 to stage 5) 
associated with each Radio Transmitter. The following are six of the stages for a give Radio 
Transmitter (RT): Receiver Group, Transmission Delay, Link Closure, Channel Match, 
Transmitter (Tx) Antenna Gain and Propagation Delay. As for the Radio Receiver, there are 
altogether eight (8) stages (stage 6 to stage 13) that associated with a Radio Receiver (RR): Rx 
Antenna Gain, Received Power, Interference Noise, Background Noise, Signal-to-Noise Ratio, 
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Bit Error Rate, Error Allocation and Error Correction. In JCSS [12] and OPNET Modeler, there 
are altogether 14 Pipeline Stages (PS) that have implemented vulnerabilities graph for 
Bayesian networks (BN) [17] analysis. These are customized collections sequence of ‘C’ or 
‘C++’ procedures (code & routines) with external Java subroutines and portable applications 
written for research purposes. In figure 2, each 14 different stages that comprised in a 
transceiver network perform a different calculation. For example in (1) Line-of-sight, (2) Signal 
strength & (3) Bit errors rates, Pipeline Stages (PS) code & routines are written in C, C++ and 
with external subroutine interfaces written in Java. Each procedure has a defined interface 
(prototype) with arguments typically a packet. Unlike most available vulnerability bulletins on 
public domains, we classify tactical wireless networks with vulnerabilities inside the 14 
different stages of a given tactical wireless RF communication transceiver. So the 
vulnerabilities graph for a given tactical transceiver may be classified as vulnerabilities in 
Radio Transmitter are: (Vt1) Receiver Group, (Vt2) Transmission Delay, (Vt3) Link Closure, 
(Vt4) Channel Match, (Vt5) Transmitter Antenna Gain and (Vt6) Propagation Delay. On the 
hand the vulnerabilities for the Radio Receiver are: (Vr1) Rx Antenna Gain, (Vr2) Received 
Power, (Vr3) Interference Noise, (Vr4) Background Noise, (Vr5) Signal-to-Noise Ratio, (Vr6) 
Bit Error Rate, (Vr7) Error Allocation and (Vr8) Error Correction. 
 
Fig. 3. An example of vulnerabilities template for JCSS (transmitter / receiver pair) and 
related simulations.  
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Using the existing JCSS tactical RF hosts configuration and profile editors with wireless 
networking analysis tools [13] [14], we can construct generic, vulnerabilities graph and 
templates to describe possible exploitations conditions with certain vulnerabilities in a given 
transceiver and then on to a larger scale, a given tactical communication network’s overall 
situation. Each template contains some pre-conditions and post-conditions of an atomic 
event related to the communication stage along with some security metric(s) information. A 
successful JCSS simulation will lead to better understanding for a more secure tactical RF 
communication model. Since we build vulnerability graphs using Bayesian networks (BN), 
we also assign probability of success after a failure in a pipeline stage’s link-edge weight.  
5.4 Algorithm within vulnerabilities graph 
Specifying valid probability of communication in different stages requires domain expert 
knowledge. Most existing vulnerabilities scanning tools report those vulnerabilities with a 
standard set of categorical security measurements, such as severity level and vulnerability 
consequences. Therefore, considering the nature of a wireless network, one can define a more 
than one dimension security or vulnerabilities matrix using these categorical information and 
quantify levels of each category into numerical values for computation and comparison basis. 
Our approach is to make each matrix entry value related to each stage in a given transceiver. 
The result can then be computed and derived by a mathematical function that receives 
contributions from various dimensions like a normal linear addictive function f(x + y) = f(x) + 
f(y) or multiplicative function f(ab) = f(a) f(b). Then, it can be converted to a value within range 
[0,1] by applying a special scalar function. A function of one or more variables whose range is 
one-dimensional, this scalar function can be applied to the matrix. Such value may be 
represented the probability of a given vulnerability with respect to the transceiver. For 
example, One can define a two dimension m × n security matrix W = (wij), with one dimension 
wi to denote severity levels and another dimension wj to denote ranges of exploits. A 3-scale 
severity level may be specified as {high = 0.95, medium = 0.65, low = 0.35}, and 2-scale exploit 
ranges may be specified as {remote = 0.55, local = 0.95}. If applying a multiplicative function to 
the matrix, then each entry value is given by wij = wi × wj. Our research constructs Bayesian 
vulnerabilities graphs with our graph generation and mapping routine by matching a list of 
stages in a given transceiver on a wireless network with profile information against a library of 
computed vulnerabilities specified node characteristic templates. For any vulnerability, if all 
pre-conditions are met, values of post-condition attributes are updated with an edge that is 
assigned with weight. It is then added to the vulnerability graph. The most common task we 
wish to solve using Bayesian networks (BN) is probabilistic inference. For example, consider the 
network G with a current vulnerability status W, and suppose we observe the fact that G with a 
status of W. There are two possible causes for this: either it is due to factor R, or the due to factor 
S is on. Which is more likely? We can use Bayesian's rule to compute the posterior probability of 
each explanation (where 0==false and 1==true).  
,
,
Pr( , 1, , 1)
Pr( 1, 1)
Pr( 1| 1) 0.2781 /0.6471 0.430
Pr( 1) Pr( 1)
Pr( , , 1, 1)
Pr( 1, 1)
Pr( 1| 1) 0.4581 /0.6471 0.708
Pr( 1) Pr( 1)
c r
c s
C c S R r W
S W
S W
W W
C c S s R W
R W
R W
W W
          
          

  
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where 
, ,
, ,
Pr( 1) Pr( , , , 1) 0.6471
c r s
c r s
W C c S s R r W        
Pr(W = 1) is a normalizing constant, equal to the probability (likelihood) of the data. So we 
see that it is more likely that the network G will have a status of W, because of the weight in 
factor R is more than factor S: i.e. the likelihood ratio is 0.7079/0.4298 = 1.647. With variable 
elimination techniques illustrated below and using vulnerabilities graph in figure 4, we use 
Bayesian networks (BN) with Bucket Elimination Algorithm implementation in the models 
with belief updating in our scenarios, to the most probable explanation. We need to provide 
vulnerability values in each communication stage within each transceiver plus the network 
scores on the entire tactical network. Finding a maximum probability assignment to each 
and the rest of variables is a challenge. We may really need to maximizing a posteriori 
hypothesis with given evidence values, finding an assignment to a subset of hypothesis 
variables that maximize their probability. On the other hand we may need to maximize the 
expected utility of the problem with given evidence and utility function, finding a subset of 
decision variables that maximize the expected utility. Any other consideration is Bucket 
Elimination Algorithm. It may be used as a framework for various probabilistic inferences 
on Bayesian Networks (BN) in the experiment. Finally, a RF Vulnerability Scoring System 
(RF-VSS) analysis is in development. It is based upon the Common Vulnerability Scoring 
System [22] and associates with additional features of Bayesian networks [17] (also known 
as belief network) that in turn yields a more refined belief decision matrix and the matrix 
can then describes a multiple criteria decision analysis (MCDA) with evidential reasoning 
approach for vulnerabilities analysis of a given tactical wireless RF network. 
 
Fig. 4. Use of Bucket Elimination Algorithm within vulnerabilities graph 
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6. Result generated from sample experiments 
For simplicity in terms of network radio analysis, we provide here a rather simple two (2) 
nodes wireless RF network scenarios that are communicating with each other via UDP 
protocol. A more complex one is illustrated in figure 5b. Using some of the available 
wireless networking analysis toolkits [13] [14] as in figure 5a, a set of JCSS EPLRS Scenarios 
with a link being jammed. Packets were being captured and exported into Microsoft EXCEL 
spreadsheet. Jamming occurs between 2 wireless links for this network: EPLRS_6004 and 
EPLRS_6013. EPLRS_6013 transceiver model was changed to a special EPLRS EW network 
vulnerability model as in figure 5c. The receiver link was intentionally jammed (by increase 
the noise level to an extremely high value, i.e. the vulnerabilities within one of the wireless 
stage are increased by many fold) so that no more simulated packet will be “successful” in 
getting through from EPLRS_6004 to EPLRS_6013 and the results are listed and illustrated in 
figure 5d with some sample data.  
 
 
Fig. 5a. Before and after scenarios using wireless networking analysis toolkits in Java 
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Fig. 5b. Wireless RF Networks 
  
Fig. 5c. Two wireless nodes network 
7. Future possibilities 
Bayesian Analysis [17] – the Bayesian’s Theorem looks at probability as a measure of a state 
of knowledge, whereas traditional probability theory looks at the frequency of an event 
happening. In other words, Bayesian probability looks at past events and prior knowledge 
and tests the likelihood that an observed outcome came from a specific probability 
distribution. With some sample field data the Bayesian’s Theorem can be applied including 
wireless RF communications & computer networking science in tactical military 
applications. The research presented here is for building a set of “Bayesian network 
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vulnerabilities graph” for vulnerability study in tactical wireless RF networks. Bayesian 
network is designed in vulnerabilities graph and model all potential attack steps in a given 
network. Each wireless network node represents a single security property violation mode; 
each link edge corresponds to an exploitation of one or more possible vulnerabilities and 
each network path represents a series of exploits that can signify a potential vulnerability for 
attack within a tactical RF wireless communication network. Inference is played a major part 
in our vulnerability calculations. Future research work will involve looking into different 
kinds of Bayesian’s network (BN) with advanced topological arrangements as in figure 6 
below with multiple experts and multiple factors analysis for our more advanced JCSS 
wireless RF vulnerabilities analysis. 
 
Fig. 5d. Sample results generated by JCSS scenarios 
 
Fig. 6. Multiple experts and multiple factors analysis 
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7.1 Adaptive Bayesian network and scoring system  
Finally, we may consider an adapted Bayesian network (BN) of wireless tactical network 
analysis with a RF Vulnerability Scoring System (RF-VSS) that can generate weighted scores 
in the research. The Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS), a NIAC research project 
from U.S. Department of Homeland Security. This rating system is designed to provide 
open and universally standard severity ratings of vulnerabilities in certain specific 
systems. It creates a global framework for disclosing information about security 
vulnerabilities. The CVSS may be recognized and generally accepted by the public in 
support, international coordination and communication to ensure successful 
implementation, education and on-going development of the scoring system. It serves a 
critical need to help organizations appropriately prioritize security vulnerabilities across 
different domains. A common scoring system has the advantages of solving the similar 
problems with better coordination. Based upon the Common Vulnerability Scoring System 
develops by Peter Mell et al. [22], we think this is a very valuable, useful tool and scoring 
system for quickly assessing wireless RF security and vulnerabilities. RF-VSS scores are 
derived from three scores: a "base network" score, an "adversaries impact" score, and an 
"environmental impact" score. These can better be described as "fixed" score, "external 
variable" score, and "wireless RF network experts" assigned score. The base network system 
score is fixed at the time the vulnerability is found and its properties do not change. The 
base assigned score includes numerous scoring metrics. Each of these metrics will then be 
chosen from a pre-determined list of options. Each option has a value. The values are then 
fed into a formula to produce the base network score. Next comes the temporal or 
adversaries impact score. The adversaries impact score changes and revises the base 
network score up or down. The temporal or adversaries impact score can also change over 
time (thus it is "time sensitive"). For example, one of the component metrics of the 
adversaries impact score is System Remediation Level (SRL). This means, there exists a 
possible common defense fixes out there, maybe from a contractor or vendor or an 
emergency research workaround. If, when the detected vulnerability is first encountered, 
there may be no possible fix, then the temporal or adversaries impact score will be much 
higher. But when a solution or fix is possible, then the score will go down dramatically. 
Again, it was temporary and a changing factor. There are three possible vulnerabilities 
metrics that make up the temporal or adversaries impact score. This score is then multiplied 
by the base network score to produce a new score. This first computed new score will be 
produced based upon the current operating wireless RF network scenarios set up via 
background expert diagnostic. The final part is the environmental impact score. This is how 
the final vulnerability will affect the wireless RF network. The researchers get to determine 
how the combined vulnerabilities might affect the overall wireless RF network in field 
deployment. If the vulnerability has very little risk or to do with all the listed factors then 
this computed score will be very, very low (like zero). There are five metrics that affect the 
environmental impact score. This portion is combined with the base network and temporal 
adversaries impact score to produce a final score. The score will be on a scale of 1-10. If it is a 
low 2, then don't be too worried. However, a rather higher score like 6 or above might 
indicate major security issues in terms of security. We will provide a vulnerabilities smart 
index by constructing a novel calculator with a set of RF Vulnerability Scoring System (RF-
VSS) for final system vulnerability analysis. For an example: For a given wireless RF radio 
network, according to expert released analysis and advisory, there are a set of “RF wireless 
www.intechopen.com
 
System Engineering Approach in Tactical Wireless RF Network Analysis 
 
325 
network vulnerabilities" being assigned. The example metrics for the given wireless RF 
network scenarios with vulnerabilities are: (1) base network impact, (2) temporal or 
adversaries’ impact and (3) Environmental impact. 
 
Fig. 7. Transposing the vulnerabilities graph into a matrix for analysis 
So, overall a base RF wireless network vulnerability score of 8.8 (very bad) that is slightly 
mitigated to 7.9 by the temporal or adversaries metrics. Still, 7.9 is not a great score and still 
has considerable amount of risk. Now, this is where the final environmental impact score 
comes in to alter the landscape. The negative impact may be bad for the overall wireless RF 
network when we look at the environmental impact metrics calculated before for certain 
wireless network scenarios as illustrated above. We gather all those factors into the RF 
Vulnerability Scoring System (RF-VSS) calculator and it produces an environmental score of 
6.5 which translates into high vulnerabilities. This is a relatively good approach to 
determine what the overall risk is for a give wireless RF network and the RF Vulnerability 
Scoring System (RF-VSS) analysis is based upon the Common Vulnerability Scoring System 
develops by Peter Mell [22] and associates with additional features of Bayesian networks 
[17] (also known as belief network). Using adjacency-matrix as a starting point, a more 
quantitative wireless RF network vulnerability assessment may be achieved. An adjacent 
edge counts as 1 unit in the matrix for an undirected graph as illustrated in figure 7. (For 
example a given X, Y coordinates that are numbered below from #1 to #6 may be transposed 
into a 6x6 matrix.) 
8. Conclusion  
A possible framework with systems engineering approach [7] [8] is utilized. The ultimate 
goal is now partially achieved by providing a comprehensive network assessment 
methodology. Our study illustrates using system engineering thinking, Bayesian networks 
[17] can be applied during the analysis as a powerful tool for calculating security metrics 
regarding information system networks. The use of our modified Bayesian network model 
with the mechanisms from CVSS is in our opinion an effective and sound methodology 
contributing towards improving the research into the development of security metrics by 
constructing a novel calculator with a set of RF Vulnerability Scoring System (RF-VSS) for 
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final system vulnerability analysis. We will continue to refine our approach using more 
dynamic Bayesian Networks to encompass the temporal domain measurements established 
in the CVSS. This short paper demonstrated an approach to model all potential 
vulnerabilities in a given tactical RF network with Bayesian graphical model. In addition, 
using a modified belief decision matrix, the research can describe a multiple criteria decision 
analysis (MCDA) using Evidential Reasoning Approach [3] [4] [5] [6]. It was used to support 
various decision analysis, assessment and evaluation activities such as impact and self 
assessments [1] [2] based on a range of quality models. In decision theory, evidential 
reasoning approach (ER) is generally a evidence-based multi-criteria decision analysis 
(MCDA) for dealing with some problems having both quantitative and qualitative criteria 
with various uncertainties including ignorance and randomness. With evidential reasoning 
approach, a generic evidence-based multi-criteria decision analysis (MCDA) approach is 
chosen for dealing with problems having both quantitative and qualitative criteria with 
variables. This matrix may be used to support various decision analysis, assessment and 
evaluation activities such as wireless RF networks environmental impact assessment and 
wireless RF networks internal nodes (transceiver) assessment based on a range of quality 
models that are developed. Bayesian vulnerabilities graphs provide comprehensive 
graphical representations with conventional spanning tree structures. The Bayesian 
vulnerabilities graph model is implemented in Java, and it is deployed along with JCSS 
software. JCSS is the Joint Net-Centric Modeling & Simulation Tool used to assess end-to-
end communication network capabilities and performance. It is the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
standard for modeling military communications systems. JCSS is a desktop software 
application that provides modeling and simulation capabilities for measuring and assessing 
the information flow through the strategic, operational, and tactical military 
communications networks. Our new tool can generate implement vulnerabilities network 
graph with link edges and weights. All these may be transposed into an adjacency-matrix as 
illustrated before for a more quantitative wireless RF network vulnerability assessment. The 
convention followed here is that an adjacent edge counts as one in a matrix for an 
undirected graph as illustrated before in figure 7. For a given X, Y coordinates, for instant; 
they can be numbered from one to six and may also be transposed into a 6x6 matrix. The 
vulnerabilities analysis with the help of system engineering approach [25] [26] [29] of a 
wireless RF network is then achieved by assigning corresponding measurement metrics 
with posterior conditional probabilities of Bayesian network [17]. The Bucket Elimination 
algorithm is adapted and modified for probabilistic inference in our approach. The most 
common approximate inference algorithms are stochastic MCMC simulation, bucket 
algorithm and related elimination steps which generalizes looping and aggregated belief 
propagation, and variation methods. A better approximate inference mechanism may be 
deployed in the near future for more complex vulnerabilities graph. Our method is very 
applicable to tactical wireless RF networks by picking, implementing each model’s 
communication stages and states. The result when using with OPNET JCSS [12] simulation 
and modeling will provide both graphical quantitative and real assessment of RF network 
vulnerabilities at a network topology state and during time of actual deployment. 
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